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THE TUNA-PORPOISE DILEMMA:
IS CONFLICT RESOLUTION ATTAINABLE?
STEPHEN 0. ANDERSEN,* ROBERT C. ANDERSON,** and
BARBARA J. SEARLES***
Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to
achieve various goals, including a reduction in the taking of marine
mammals incident to commercial fishing operations to "levels ap-
proaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate."1 Implementation
of the Act has precipitated intense legal and political battles, particu-
larly with regard to porpoise protection, while the performance of
the Act to date is believed by many to have fallen short of the
legislative goal. The thesis of this paper is that most of the tuna-
porpoise controversy as well as the failure to approach a zero por-
poise mortality rate can be traced to ineffective and inefficient
porpoise protection. By relying on improvements in technology and
industry-wide quotas, rather than on an incentive approach, the fed-
eral government has failed to achieve maximum porpoise protection
at least cost to society.
This presentation examines the origins of the tuna-porpoise con-
troversy-the technologies of tuna harvest and porpoise protection
and the manner of tuna exploitation control proscribed by the Act.
Then, it turns to the central issue of porpoise protection. The exis-
ting regulatory framework is contrasted to porpoise protection under
an incentive system. We conclude that the current regulatory system
does not meet the efficiency test, that porpoise protection is not
afforded at least cost to society. Moreover, we conclude that while
the regulatory approach is unlikely to achieve the goal of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act without imposing severe economic penalties
on the tuna industry, the incentive system should achieve that goal
with less disruption and a lower cost to the industry and to society.
*Faculty, College of the Atlantic, Bar Harbor, Maine, and formerly with Sierra Club
Research.
"Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C. and Consultant to the Office of Ocean
Management, NOAA.
***Research Associate.
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1. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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BACKGROUND,
The United States tuna fleet fishes along the west coast of the
Americas, from Baja California south to Chile, off the west coast of
Africa, and in new areas in the Central Pacific and Indian Ocean. The
porpoise-related tuna fishing, however, occurs only in the eastern
tropical Pacific (ETP) region,2 one habitat of the yellowfin tuna,
Thunnus albacores.3
The yellowfin tuna is regulated by the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC), 4 which was created in 1949 by a treaty
between Costa Rica and the United States. The IATTC was formed
to protect stocks of inshore .tuna along the coast of Central American
countries, where the tuna-porpoise conflict is now centered. Under
the IATTC, overall catch is regulated within the Commission Yellow-
fin Regulation Area (CYRA) s by vessels of all member nations
(United States, Canada, Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama,
France, and Japan) on a first-come-fastest-catching basis until the
fleet quota is reached and the season closed.6
"Open season," which lasts three or four months, begins January
first of each year throughout the season. The IATTC monitors the
catch through periodic radio reports from the vessels and landing
reports collected by IATTC personnel in all member ports. As the
annual fleet quota is approached, the open season is closed and ves-
sels are limited to yellowfin catches incidental to other species in the
CYRA.' Boats in port on the day the season is closed can make one
additional trip inside the CYRA without restriction and boats at sea
are allowed to fill their holds inside the CYRA. Regulated trips are
made within the CYRA after the season is closed.
During the 1960's and early 1970's the purse seine fleet enjoyed
large profits, stimulating new entry into the fishery. Because of the
short open season, the new boats emphasized design features such as
2. The ETP is bounded on the west by 150'W longitude, on the east by the Americas, on
the north by approximately 30'N latitude, and on the south by approximately 20'S lati-
tude.
3. The word "tuna" is applied to several species of related finfish including: Pacific
yellowfin, big eye, albacore, shipjack, blackfin, Atlantic yellowfin, bonita, and other tuna-
like fish. Yellowfin tuna are labeled "chunk light tuna" in the retail trade.
4. A summary of the IATTC development, its management strategies, and the political,
biological, and economic implications of its management strategies is given by J. Joseph,
Assessment Studies of Yellowfin Tuna in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (Paper presented at
the 31st meeting of the IATTC, March, 1975).
5. The CYRA lies within the boundaries of the eastern tropical Pacific, extending west-
ward from the coast of Baja California to 125°W longitude and southeast to a point off the
coast of Northern Chile at 90'W by 20'S latitude.
6. Some of the "developing nations" are allowed special allocations during the closed
season.
7. Incidental catches of yellowfin may range up to 15 percent of total catch.
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large capacity and powerful, high-speed engines in an attempt by the
individual owners to capture larger shares of the overall tuna quota.
Unknown to the general public at that time was the fact that hun-
dreds of thousands of porpoise were being killed each year as part of
the tuna harvest.
TUNA HARVEST AND PORPOISE PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY
In the early years of the tuna industry, a pole and line fishing
technique was commonly used by American fishermen. This fishing
gear consists of a bamboo pole with a length of line and a feathered
barbless hook or a baited hook attached. When bait is thrown into
the water, the tuna are hooked while in their feeding frenzy. The
long line method is employed primarily by Japanese vessels in trop-
ical and temperate waters today. The long line approach uses lengths
of rope secured by a series of buoys, from which a minimum of 1500
baited hooks are attached to individual branch lines, each extending
several hundred feet into the water. Because tuna found in the east-
ern tropical Pacific commonly associate with floating objects and
porpoise and because sea birds are often attracted by the same small
fish which attract the tuna in these waters, fishermen have long used
such associations to locate tuna schools.8
Technological innovations in the past twenty years have made it
possible for the tuna industry to shift from the labor intensive pole-
and-line fishing method to the highly mechanized and more efficient
techniques of purse seining. During the 1960's skippers learned that
small speedboats could direct the movement of porpoises and that
the tuna would continue to follow the porpoise. This discovery
allowed purse seiners to deploy nets at will and greatly increased the
efficiency of harvest. Unfortunately, porpoise herding also increased
the porpoise mortality rate.
The procedure of "setting on porpoise" begins by first locating
porpoise and confirming that tuna are below. Through experience,
fishermen have learned that a successful set may be accomplished
when the porpoise are actually captured or encircled by nets along
with the tuna. To achieve this, several speedboats are launched to
"corral" the porpoise. A large powered skiff, attached to one end of
the three-quarter-mile-long nylon net, is released from the stern of
the tuna seiner and the seiner then moves ahead of the porpoise
school while deploying the net. Once the seiner and skiff have en-
8. The yellowfin tuna typically swim at depths of about 200 feet and would otherwise be
much more difficult to locate.
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circled the school, the skiff transfers its end of the net to the seiner.
The top of the seine net is fastened to a floating cork line, and the
bottom, which extends approximately 350 feet deep, is weighted
down by a heavy wire cable. The cable is then winched up causing
the net to close much like a string purse, thus giving the process the
name "purse seining." The winch then hauls one end of the "pursed"
net aboard the boat. When this occurs, the tuna usually accumulate
in the deep central pocket of the net near the boat, while the por-
poise float in a tight group at the far end of the net near the cork line
in the area of least disturbance.
When more than half of the net is aboard and secured, a signal is
given for the "backdown" to begin, a procedure designed to release
the porpoise from the net. The tuna seiner switches into reverse and
the cork line partially dips under the water allowing the porpoise to
escape. According to Kenneth Norris, an authority on marine mam-
mals at the University of California at Santa Cruz, at least half of the
total porpoise mortality incidental to tuna fishing occurs through
drowning after backdown maneuvers have begun.9 Although the
major physical cause of mortality is uncertain, it is recognized that
some porpoise drown as a consequence of being entangled in the
meshes of the net while others die of shock.
Extreme variation is found in the average porpoise mortality per
set. A disproportionately high porpoise mortality occurs on the in-
frequent sets where the net collapses before the porpoise can escape.
The factors which appear to be most closely related to the porpoise
kill rate are the gear being used, the skill of the skipper and the
degree to which the crew's effort is directed to porpoise protection,
environmental conditions such as wind, and the species of porpoise
in the set.1 0
Porpoise protection and rescue devices have been developed by the
industry and refined through National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) gear research. Some devices have become a part of NMFS
regulations, as indicated by the 1978 regulations which specify:1
(1) the same gear requirements as in 1977-which include 1 -inch
mesh porpoise safety panels; the use of backdown; the use of
hand release procedures; the use of rubber raft, face mask, and
snorkel; prohibition of the use of sharp objects for rescuing
porpoise; the installation of speedboat bunchlines; proper speed-
9. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 18, 1976, at 1.
10. The importance of the skill and dedication of the crew in protecting the porpoise was
emphasized repeatedly in the 1977 hearings on the proposed NMFS regulations, see Trans-
cripts at 654-55, 836.
11. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,551 (1977).
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boat use; use of lights after dark; annual vessel inspection; and
vessel operator training; 
1 2
(2) the supervised installation of the "super-apron" system;
(3) the arrangement of bunchlines to establish towing points;
(4) a minimum of two-man speedboats to be in the water until
backdown commences; and
(5) that exactly three bow bunches be pulled.
The marked decline in porpoise mortality during recent years (Table
1) has been attributed in part to the use of improved porpoise pro-
tection gear. The 1974 decline stems from a drop in the proportion
of sets which were made on porpoise during that year.
TABLE 1
INCIDENTAL PORPOISE MORTALITY ESTIMATES
Year U.S. Vessels Non-U.S. Vessels
1971 310,000 9,000
1972 306,000 42,000
1973 175,000 42,000
1974 99,000 21,000
1975 134,000 47,000
1976 104,000 44,000
1977 24,000
Source: National Marine Fisheries Service, Environmental Impact Statement 39 (1977).
REGULATION UNDER THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION
ACT OF 1972
Although porpoise deaths were not the sole impetus for new Fed-
eral regulations regarding the taking of marine mammals, they were a
major factor leading Congress to pass the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972. This Act was a natural extension of the philosophy
already articulated in the Endangered Species Preservation Act of
1966 and the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969.1 3 Con-
gress delayed the effective date of the Act relative to incidental
taking during commercial fishing operations for two years in order to
permit industry to make necessary adjustments.' 4 The most signifi-
cant feature of the Marine Mammal Protection Act is the moratorium
on the taking and importation of marine mammals, although a num-
ber of exceptions to this moratorium were written into the stat-
12. National Marine Fisheries Service, Final Environmental Impact Statement 16 (1977).
13. M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 324 (1977).
14. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §1371(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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ute.' ' Of interest to this paper is the exception for the taking of
marine mammals "incidental to the course of commercial fishing
operations."' 6
Under the Act, in issuing regulations governing the taking of
marine mammals, the Secretary of Commerce is to give full con-
sideration to all factors which affect marine mammals, including:' '
(1) existing and future levels of marine species and stocks;
(2) existing international treaties and agreements;
(3) the marine ecosystem and the related environment;
(4) the conservation and development of fishing resources; and(5) the economic implications and technological feasibility of im-
plementation.
The Act specifies two goals of marine mammal protection. The first
goal is the attainment of the optimum sustainable populations of
marine mammals; the second is ". . . that the incidental kill or inci-
dental serious injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of
commercial fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels
approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate." 1 8 Litigation in
the tuna-porpoise controversy has focused on the first goal, NMFS
and the tuna industry having placed less emphasis on the second
goal.' 9
With respect to the first goal, it should be noted that the Act
specifies no mathematical definition of optimum sustainable popula-
tion, describing it only as "the number of animals which will result in
the maximum productivity of the population of the species, keeping
in mind the optimum carrying capacity of the habitat and the health
of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent element." 2"
Recently, however, the NMFS proposed a working definition of op-
timum sustainable population:
Optimum sustainable population is a population size which falls
within a range from that population level of a given species or stock
which is the largest supportable within the ecosystem to the popula-
15. The exceptions in §1371 included (1) taking for scientific research, (2) taking by
Alaska natives for subsistence, and (3) taking incidental to commercial fishing.
16. Although an exception was granted for taking of marine mammals incidental to
commercial fishing operations, the Act specified that the immediate goal was to reduce
these takings to a near zero level (See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975)).
17. Id. §1373(b).
18. Id. §1371(a)(2).
19. The NMFS has taken the view that the new regulations for 1978-1980 "meet the goal
of the Act to reduce mortality to the lowest possible level," 42 Fed. Reg. 64,550 (1977).
For reasons noted later, the authors of this paper do not fully support this view.
20. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(9) (Supp. V 1975).
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tion level that results in maximum net productivity. Maximum net
productivity is the greatest net annual increment in population num-
bers or biomass resulting from additions to the population due to
reproduction and growth less losses due to natural mortality.2
The lower boundary of the optimum sustainable population, that
below which a marine mammal species would be considered depleted
and ineligible for taking, is considered to be within a range of 50 to
70 percent of the initial or maximum stock size.
2 2
The tuna-porpoise litigation can be traced to a draft report on the
impact of purse-seine fishing on porpoise which was published in
1974 by the Southwest Fisheries Center of the NMFS. 2 1 It esti-
mated that the population level of spotted porpoise could be 30
percent to 80 percent lower than the carrying capacity of the eco-
system, and that this reduction in porpoise stocks could be attrib-
uted to purse seining operations. Despite these findings, NMFS issued
to the tuna industry a general permit for the incidental taking of an
unlimited number of porpoise. On October 4, 1974, the Committee
for Humane Legislation brought an action in Committee for Humane
Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson24  to have the NMFS regulations
declared invalid and to thereby enjoin the NMFS from issuing per-
mits to tuna seine fishermen. At issue was whether the Secretary of
Commerce through the NMFS had prepared statements of the esti-
mated porpoise stocks and the impact of the regulations on the
stocks.2 s
In August 1975 the American Tunaboat Association applied for a
renewal of its porpoise permit. NMFS then proposed a quota of
between 50,000 and 100,000 porpoise. Because of objections raised
by conservationists, however, the NMFS had agreed in the fall of
1975 to refrain from publishing its 1976 regulations until a confer-
ence could be held between representatives of the fishing industry
and the conservationists to help reduce the conflicts. At the confer-
ence that September, the industry expressed concern over the pro-
posed quota and opposed a mandatory observer on each boat. The
conservationists refused to accept the proposed quota and insisted on
mandatory observers. In an attempt at compromise, the NMFS pub-
21. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,536 (1976) (amending 50 C.F.R. §216.3).
22. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,016 (1977).
23. See NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
DRAFT REPORT ON PORPOISE MORTALITY INCIDENTAL TO TUNA PURSE-SEINE
FISHING FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 (1974).
24. 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
25. The litigation is summarized in Nafziger & Armstrong, The Porpoise-Tuna Contro-
versy: Management of Marine Resources After Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v.
Richardson, 7 ENVT'L L. REV. 223 (1977).
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lished its 1976 regulations that December, calling for observers on
ten percent of the boats and delaying setting of the quota until the
1976 season's take approached 70 percent of the 1975 levels.
On May 11, 1976, the action brought by the Committee for
Humane Legislation, Inc. was decided. Judge Richey of the District
Court, District of Columbia, ruled that the NMFS regulations and
permits were void under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. He
ruled that the NMFS had not only failed to determine the optimum
sustainable population of each species of porpoise and the effect of
the proposed taking on the stocks, but had also failed to specify the
number of animals that could be killed. The Court ruled that no
permits would be issued until these statutory requirements were met.
However, the court order was appealed and a stay granted which
allowed the continued taking of porpoise.
In an attempt to meet the statutory requirements of the Act, the
NMFS convened a workshop of scientists on July 27-31, 1976, to
help the NMFS in estimating the population of various species and
stocks of porpoise affected by the yellowfin tuna purse-seining oper-
ations. The workshop report provided the basis for new NMFS regu-
lations for the 1977 season. A total U.S. quota of 59,050 was estab-
lished for twelve species or stocks for which taking would be
permitted2 6 and setting on five other stocks, including the eastern
spinner, would be prohibited. Additionally, the NMFS proposed to
have observers on a minimum of 130 vessel trips and to require boats
to use small mesh webbing and additional porpoise rescue equip-
ment, such as flood lights and a snorkel-equipped diver on a raft
during backdown.? 7 In protest, particularly over the prohibition on
five species, the industry ceased fishing and returned to port. Sub-
sequently, the fleet was encouraged to return to sea after the regula-
tions were modified to (1) increase the allowable take to 62,429
animals, reflecting a reassessment of the whitebelly spinner popula-
tion, and (2) permit accidental taking of the prohibited species.
The estimated porpoise take of 24,143 during 1977 fell short of
the quota for a variety of reasons. One factor was the fact that when
the fishermen returned to sea after ending their protest, they found
26. The initial NMFS proposal was for a quota of 29,920. The industry recommended
96,100, the Environmental Defense Fund and the Marine Mammal Commission 53,120 and
50,158, respectively. The Administrative Law Judge had recommended 96,100. The final
decision of the NMFS Director was 59,050.
27. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,010-12,020 (1977). The proposals were first published in 41 Fed.
Reg. 45,015 (1976). Hearings were conducted in San Diego, Nov. 22-26, and in Washington,
D.C., during November and December. The proposed regulations were accepted with only
minor modification by Administrative Law Judge Frank W. Vanderheyden.
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2 8tuna in locations which did not have many porpoise. Also credited
for much of the improvement were the increased care demonstrated
by the fishermen and the deployment of porpoise-saving tech-
nology.2 9
The NMFS recently issued final regulations covering 1978, 1979,
and 1980.30 Individual species and stock quotas totaling 51,945,
1,610, and 31,150, respectively, were established for each of the
three years and three major gear regulations were set for 1978.
First, use of the super-apron was required on all vessels greater
than 400 tons carrying capacity and built after 1960. 1 A super-
ipron system reportedly will require more time in releasing porpoise
but proportionately less time for the overall set when one considers
the time otherwise spent untangling and disposing of porpoise from
the net in the brailing portion of the fishing operation. The cost of
the apron was estimated at $3000 per boat;3 2 installation may take a
Jay or less, and a trial set, also required under the regulations, may
require an additional day. If a boat would not otherwise be fishing
:n those two days, the cost to the boat is limited to the equipment
-xpense plus the cost of testing. If a boat would otherwise fish, the
inancial cost is the net daily profit, unless the effect of outfitting all
the vessels is to extend the season. The second provision requires that
iessels employ porpoise-release procedures, specifically backdown
md the use of speedboats to hold open the net at the cork line
luring backdown. The third provision prohibits intentional sets on
the eastern spinner porpoise due to the findings that the stock is
lepleted.
The tuna industry opposed the regulations, contending that if
-educed quotas were met or exceeded for any particular species,
iarvest opportunities would be restricted and costs per unit catch
would increase.3 3 According to industry testimony, the prohibition
igainst sets on schools containing eastern spinners restricts fishermen
md further increases the costs per unit catch. The tuna industry
,ought a quota of between 78,000 and 81,000 animals for 1978, and
flexible quotas for the years following. The industry claimed that the
N'MFS regulations were based on insufficient evidence of technologi-
,al feasibility and that, because the porpoise stocks are healthy, regu-
ation would be unnecessary and unwarranted.
28. Washington Post, January 7, 1977, at 4.
29. Final Decision by Administrative Law Judge, Frank W. Vanderheyden, at 40.
30. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (1977).
31. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,551 (1977).
32. Brief for NMFS.
33. Brief for tuna industry.
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EVALUATION OF THE NMFS REGULATORY APPROACH
The contention of the Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, of which the NMFS is an element, is
that the regulations which have been proposed for the 1978, 1979,
and 1980 seasons meet the goal of the Act to reduce porpoise mor-
tality to the lowest possible levels. 3 4 We argue here that such is not
the case, that lower porpoise mortality is technologically feasible,
and moreover, that it could be achieved for, at most, a modest in-
crease in cost to society.
Just as the various tuna commissions have opted for annual quotas
on the catch as the principal regulatory device to protect the long-
run productivity of the tuna fisheries, so also the NMFS has opted
for quotas on individual species to protect the porpoise stocks. In
addition, NMFS has opted to dictate the choice of gear and porpoise
rescue devices which must be used. Both policy choices have serious
limitations.
The deficiencies of the quota approach are well known and will
not be repeated in detail here. Among other shortcomings, it encour-
ages each fisherman to capture as large a share of the quota as is
possible before it is filled, so that the harvest of fish is accelerated.
Additionally, as has been amply documented by others, the effect of
relying on the tuna quota as the primary mangement tool has been to
induce excessive investment in the industry. 3 - To capture as large a
share of the IATTC quota as is possible, many fishermen have se-
lected large, high-speed vessels and other costly gear to minimize
travel time and accelerate the harvest of fish. From the viewpoint of
industry efficiency, these outlays for engines, large boats, and time-
saving gear are unwarranted, but to the individuals involved, the
investments are perceived as one means of obtaining a larger share of
the overall quota.3 6
Furthermore, by not controlling the entry of new fishermen, the
IATTC permitted excessive growth in fleet size in response to the
profits which were being earned in the late 1960's and early 1970's,
It has been estimated that the present fleet is at least twice the size
necessary for the harvest of the maximum sustained yield of tuna ir
the eastern tropical Pacific.3 7 Using current fishing practices, the
34. 42 Fed. Reg. 64,550 (1977).
35. S. Saila & V. Norton, Tuna: Status, Trends, and Alternative Management Arrange
ments (RFF/PISFA Paper 6, 1974); V. Flagg, Optimal Output and Economic Rent of tho
Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna Fishery: An Empirical Analysis, 36 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 14
(1977).
36. Recent estimates are that vessels of 800 to 1,200 tons are most efficient but that nev
additions to the fleet will be in the 2,000 ton range.
37. Flagg, supra note 35, at 29.
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U.S. fleet is capable of harvesting the entire annual quota in the
2YRA in approximately three months.
The effects of the porpoise quota on the economics of tuna fishing
ire similar. During that part of the year before the tuna quota for
the IATTC area is reached, individual fishermen are pressured by the
raeed to catch as large a share of the commission quota as is possible.
Porpoise are a free good; there is no penalty for killing a porpoise
antil the individual species quotas are reached. 8 The high historic
levels of porpoise mortality suggest that, at least in the past, porpoise
protection was not consistent with maximizing the tuna catch for
lndividual fishermen. Recent evidence from experimental cruises is
that best porpoise protection practice should not increase the time
per set and may actually save some time. Nonetheless, with porpoise
n effect a free input to the process of catching tuna, the incentive to
protect the porpoise is weak at best.
Once the porpoise quota has been filled, the industry faces an
mtirely new structure of incentives. Fines up to $20,000 can be
issessed for intentional porpoise kills. In contrast to the situation
,efore the porpoise quota has been filled, where porpoise are viewed
is a free good to the individual fisherman, once the quota is filled the
?orpoise must be treated as a very expensive input to the process of
'iarvesting tuna.
Although experience under a filled porpoise quota is limited to a
few weeks in 1976, there is evidence that porpoise mortality can be
reduced sharply from the typical experiences during unfilled quotas.
[n contrast to the average industry performance during the 1970's of
ipproximately one porpoise kill per ton of tuna caught, recent ef-
Forts using best techniques indicates that the rate of porpoise kill
may be held to less than one per hundred tons caught.3 9 If fisher-
mnen could be induced to adopt best techniques, the porpoise kill
-ould, according to these recent experiences, be held to a maximum
A a few thousand animals per year.
In addition to industry-wide quotas on the individual porpoise
;pecies, the NMFS has mandated the use of several forms of porpoise
,rotective gear. Without on-board observers on all trips, gear require-
mnents are unlikely to be fully effective because the gear may not be
ised in its intended manner; the fishermen still profit from rapid
iarvest under the industry-wide tuna and porpoise quotas and would
38. Without an observer on board every vessel, it will be difficult to detect that the
,orpoise quotas are being met or exceeded.
39. Experiments during 1976 and 1977 with improved gear and techniques on the seiner,
Elizabeth C.J., resulted in an average porpoise mortality of one for every eleven sets of the
let. The kill rate per ton of tuna harvested was .004. See supra note 12, part 2, at 35.
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be likely to use the gear in its intended manner only to the extent it
lowers cost or accelerates the rate of tuna capture. Furthermore, the
fishermen have no incentive to develop yet more effective devices for
porpoise protection.
ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES
The principal deficiency of present NMFS regulations governing
the taking of porpoise is that they induce desired behavior on the
part of the tuna industry only to the extent that porpoise protection
increases the efficiency of the tuna harvest. When the porpoise are, in
effect, a free good, there is at best only a weak incentive for fisher-
men to use the best porpoise-saving techniques. When the porpoise
quota has been reached, penalties for capturing an additional por-
poise probably outweigh the expected value of any further tuna
catch. But, if the fishermen could be induced to recognize the value
of porpoise throughout the season, the occasional problem of indis-
criminant porpoise slaughter early in the season, as well as that of an
effective ban on fishing on porpoise once the quota has been
reached, could largely be eliminated.
At least three methods exist for insuring that fishermen would
continue to seek methods for reducing their porpoise kills and nol
treat porpoise as a free good. The first and simplest conceptually
would be to place a price on each porpoise which is killed, the pricc
to be fixed through either governmental regulation or at an auctior
of marketable (exchangeable) porpoise permits.4 0 This system would
reward those who have invested in porpoise-saving technologies and
would offer a continuing incentive to each skipper to practice the
best techniques.
A second procedure for achieving desired porpoise protection anc
efficient tuna harvest would be to grant individual porpoise quotas tc
each fisherman or each boat. With an individual quota, an incentivc
exists to treat the porpoise as having a value. Should an individua
porpoise quota be filled before the season is over, no more fishin
from that boat using porpoise as locators would be allowed for th
rest of that season. One desirable modification of this approaci
40. On May 5, 1977, Representative Murphy proposed, in H.R. 6970 amending thl
Marine Mammal Protection Act, to incorporate many of the economic incentives present i
a system of marketable vessel porpoise quotas. In order to provide continuing incentives t(
individual skippers to practice porpoise protection: (1) the Secretary of Commerce coub
refuse to issue permits to fish on porpoise to those skippers who exceeded the industry-widi
porpoise kill factor per trip by more than 100 percent, (2) fees would be charged for thi
permits but incentive payments would be made to the skippers whose kill factor is less thai
50 percent of the industry average, and (3) an additional fee of $32 per porpoise would bi
assessed for each porpoise killed in excess of the industry average per trip.
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would be to allow transfer of the porpoise quota among boats or
fishermen. In this way, the careful fisherman, using the best tech-
niques, would be able to sell his unused quotas to the less careful or
less skilled members of the industry.
A third approach is to eliminate the economic institutions that
encourage porpoise taking. Porpoise may be protected to some ex-
tent by marketable, individual boat tuna quotas. The incentive to
minimize the time per set would be reduced, allowing more time to
be devoted to porpoise protection. This solution is particularly at-
tractive because it would gradually eliminate overcapitalization
created by open access to the tuna fishery. This regulatory option
could be combined with boat porpoise quotas or porpoise kill fees.
The final environmental impact statement (EIS) issued by the
NMFS covering the proposed 1978, 1979, and 1980 porpoise quotas
reviewed the idea of using individual porpoise quotas both to fisher-
men and to vessels as alternatives to the overall industry-wide quota.
The EIS noted that individual quotas would require the promulga-
tion of new regulations under Section 104 of the Act and that cer-
tain legal and funding problems would have to be worked out.4 I One
of the critical problems in allocating individual quotas is the wide
variation in technology and skill which is represented in the vessels
and skippers. Issues of fairness must also be addressed; to penalize
poor performance when it is subject to the individual's control may
be desirable, but to force a vessel or skipper to cease fishing because
of a streak of isolated and uncontrollable high kills would not seem
equitable.4 2
The EIS notes that many of the problems inherent in granting
individual quotas are eliminated when marketable porpoise quotas
are auctioned to interested vessel owners. The advantage to such an
auction is that good performance would be rewarded directly and
poor performance would be penalized directly through the amount
which must be spent to purchase the needed share of the industry
quota. Furthermore, the NMFS would not be placed in the uncom-
fortable position of deciding how large a share of the quota should
go to each vessel or skipper. Rather, the market process would fix
these allocations.
A problem with any porpoise protection scheme which relies on
estimates of individual porpoise kills is that an observer is required
41. Supra note 12, at 50 & 53.
42. These points have also been made by Franklin Alverson, a spokesman for the tuna
industry, in Hearings on H.R. 6970 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conser-
vation and the Environment of the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 345-48 (1977).
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aboard each boat. The regulations for 1978 through 1980 will place
observers on a minimum of 130 trips annually (out of some 400-plus
trips by the industry). The NMFS has estimated that it would cost
from four to five million dollars to monitor all of the trips made by
the U.S. fleet each year ($30,000-$40,000 per vessel, per year). The
observers, like other federal inspectors and wardens, would be sub-
ject to threats or bribes and may need some special training. The
potential problem of threats, while it must not be overlooked, in
theory should be manageable if the price per porpoise is low. In fact,
however, the problem of threats may provide the ultimate constraint
in reducing the overall industry quota of marketable permits.
Inasmuch as the Marine Mammal Protection Act specifies the
immediate goal of reducing porpoise kills to levels approaching zero,
statutory responsibility would appear to obligate the Secretary of
Commerce to request Congressional appropriations for the sums
required for observers on each vessel if these expenditures would
reduce porpoise kills significantly. We believe that marketable por-
poise quotas, offered annually at auction, would achieve the intent
of the Act, that such marketable quotas would provide a powerful
incentive to reduce dramatically the kill levels relative to those speci-
fied in the new regulations, and that the ensuing economic cost of
porpoise protection imposed upon industry and consumers should
not rise substantially.4 3
One of the potential problems which could adversely affect any
program for porpoise protection is that vessels would transfer to
other nations of registry to escape U.S. restrictions. Two distinct
issues must be kept in focus. First, does vessel transfer pose an imme-
diate threat to the success of existing porpoise protection efforts?
Second, would individual vessel quotas, as outlined in the paper,
provide a greater inducement for change of registry than exists at
present? We believe that in both cases the answer is no.
The actual rate of transfer of purse seiners in 1975 through 1977
was very low. One converted purse seiner was transferred in 1975
and another in 1976; two new purse seiners were transferred in 1976.
Recently, the Maritime Administration granted permission for thir-
teen additional transfers. The low rate of transfer may be explained
in part by U.S. import restrictions on tuna which is taken in a man-
ner which does not conform to U.S. laws and regulations governing
the protection of marine mammals. Another important factor in-
43. The principal societal cost of porpoise protection with a system of marketable por-
poise quotas is for the observers needed to monitor each trip. The potential savings to the
industry lie in the flexibility to choose the method of protection which is cost effective for
the individual skipper or vessel.
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hibiting transfers to escape U.S. marine mammal protection is the
requirement of the Maritime Administration that any foreign pur-
chaser must agree to conform to present and future U.S. laws and
regulations governing the protection of marine mammals.
CONCLUSION
The NMFS regulatory approach of sharply 4ecreasing annual por-
poise quotas and the use of mandated gear has evolved from the
interaction of several forces. First, the Service has a very limited
budget to allocate to all forms of marine mammal protection and an
intensive program of porpoise protection and management would
require the use of funds currently devoted to other marine mammal
protection programs. Second, the tuna industry strongly resists the
suggestion of intensive governmental involvement in marine mammal
protection and argues that a technological solution will significantly
reduce porpoise kills. Third, the environmental interests have applied
continuing pressure to have lower kill limits imposed each year.
This strategy by NMFS should accomplish the objective of re-
ducing porpoise mortality, but it may do it at a high cost to the
industry and society and not achieve the legislative goal of near-zero
kills. Only if porpoise protection results in a significant time savings
per set will fishermen have a strong incentive to avoid porpoise mor-
tality. Otherwise, it is likely that the annual industry-wide quotas
will be filled each year and that the industry will continue to point
to the declining quota as a root cause of the financial plight of the
industry.
By not permitting fishermen to choose their own most cost effec-
tive form of porpoise protection, the NMFS discourages innovation.
By relying on an industry-wide quota, the NMFS decreases efficiency
in that porpoise are a free good for part of the year and very expen-
sive for the remainder of the year. Rather than relying on a single
technique for porpoise protection, the individual skippers must de-
velop different strategies for the two periods.
If society is truly interested in achieving maximum porpoise pro-
tection with minimum disruption to the tuna industry, we highly
commend the use of marketable porpoise quotas, offered at auction
each year. Such a system would give flexibility to the industry in the
protection technique used, would offer incentives to each fisherman
to minimize kills, and would apply this incentive uniformly through-
out the fishing season.
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